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Abstract
This paper argues that because of its perceived strategic national interest and the wrong
advice it received from experts and racist assumptions about the Oromo, the U.S.
government has allied with the Tigrayan minority elites to form a colonial government
and to suppress the Oromo national movement. Thus, the major question becomes will
the Obama administration respect the rights of African peoples in general and that of the
Oromo in particular?

Introduction
Global strategic interests and geopolitics rather than the mutual benefits of the American
and African peoples have mainly shaped U.S. foreign policy objectives and priorities on
the African continent. As the U.S. emerged as the global hegemonic power by replacing
Great Britain after the World War II, it used Africa as “a strategic stepping stone” to the
Middle East, and during the Cold War as “a pawn in East-West struggles” (Carter, 2009:
1). Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the U.S. has been using Africa for
its objective of the so-called war on global terrorism by allying with some dictatorial and
terrorist African regimes, such as that of Ethiopia, that engage in state terrorism and gross
human rights violations while giving lip service to the issues of democracy, human rights,
and economic and social development. Consequently, the U.S. government has been
building relations with the parasitic African ruling classes and their repressive and
exploitative governments at the cost of the ordinary African peoples.
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The tragedy in the U.S. foreign policy toward Africa is that there is no a single
standard in dealing with African countries, governments, and peoples. For example when
the U.S. criticizes Sudan, Zimbabwe, and other countries for not promoting democracy
and protecting human rights, it glosses over the criminal policies of certain governments
such as that of Ethiopia that “are falling into line to act as puppets of U.S. imperialism”
(Talbot, 2006: 3). Currently, the U.S. government supports the Tigrayan-led minority
regime of Ethiopia morally, financially, diplomatically, and militarily by disregarding its
authoritarian-terrorist characteristics and its massive human rights violations (Jalata,
2005). How did the U.S. start to support the Tigrayan-led minority government of
Ethiopia instead of its Amhara-based client state?
Paul Henze (1985: 74), one of the architects of the American-Tigrayan alliance,
argued in the mid-1980s that the Tigrayans “as much as the Amhara, are an imperial
people who, despite their loyalty to tradition, think of themselves as having a right—and
perhaps even a duty—to play a role in the larger political entity of which they are a part.”
While promoting the Tigrayan ethnonational interest, the same American ideologue
dismissed the political significance of the Oromo people, the largest ethnonational group,
by arguing that Oromo grievance “is both territorially and politically diffuse and unlikely
to coalesce into a coherent ethnic resistance movement” (Henze, 1985: 65). In a
multinational empire like Ethiopia, to identify and support one ethnonation to dominate
and exploit other ethnonations claiming that it has the right to rule or it is culturally
superior is racist (Jalata, 2001: 89-132). In justifying this racist action, Henze (1985: 74)
asserted that the Tigrayans recognize “the need to reconstitute Ethiopia and establish a
just government recognizing regional rights and ethnic distinctions” as “a natural
outgrowth of . . . [their] view of Ethiopian history.”
Just as the Tigrayans are justified to rule and dominate other peoples by their
sense of “fairness,” they are also seen as pro-West because “they do not try to claim they
are Arabs and they do not seek the support of Arab governments,” according to Henze
(1985: 74). Implicit in these arguments is that other peoples in the Ethiopian Empire,
such as the Oromo, are pro-Arab and anti-West and lack a sense of fairness to deal with
other peoples. Henze (1985: 65) dismisses the Oromo struggle for national selfdetermination as the following: “The claims of the Oromo Liberation Front of widespread
organization and effectiveness inside Ethiopia cannot be substantiated by firm evidence.
Oromia as a territorial entity has no meaning inside Ethiopia. It is an exile construct.”
Based on such false assumptions, U.S. foreign policy experts like Henze advised the
American government to invest in the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and
dismissed the relevance of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other liberation fronts
in the Ethiopian Empire.
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Because of its perceived strategic national interest and the wrong advice it
received from experts and racist assumptions about the Oromo (Jalata, 2001), the U.S.
government has allied with the Tigrayan minority elites to form a colonial government
and to suppress the Oromo national movement. As Douglas Hellinger (1992: 80) notes,
“What is missing from U.S. policy toward Africa is a basic respect for the people, their
knowledge and their right to collectively determine their own future.” Will the Obama
administration respect the rights of African peoples in general and that of the Oromo in
particular? Will President Obama (2009) respect his inaugural promise and make African
dictators in general and Meles Zenawi in particular accountable because they silence
dissent and “cling to power through corruption and deceit?” For sake of clarity and
critical understanding of the essence of the U.S. foreign policy in Oromia and Ethiopia,
let us historically explore the relationship between the U.S. and the Ethiopian state.

U.S. Hegemonism and the Haile Selassie Government
Since the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. government as the hegemonic power of the
capitalist world system has supported the Amhara-Tigray governments of Haile Selassie
and Meles Zenawi at the cost the colonized national groups, such as the Oromo. Between
the early 1950s and the 1970s, the U.S. introduced its “modernization” programs to the
Ethiopian Empire and supported the Haile Selassie government (Jalata, 1993: 88-99).
Several scholars demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policy toward Oromia and Ethiopia
consolidated the racial/ethnonational hierarchy that was formed by the alliance of
Ethiopian colonialism and European imperialism (Jalata, 1993; Holcomb and Ibssa,
1990). When the Haile Selassie government was overthrown by the popular revolt of
1974, a military dictatorship emerged and allied with the former Soviet Union until 1991,
when it was overthrown. With the support of the former Soviet Union, the military
regime protected and extended the interests of Amhara-Tigrayan colonial settlers in
Oromia and other colonized regions.
At the end of the 1980s, a structural crisis that manifested itself in national
movements, famine, poverty, and internal contradictions within the ruling elite factions
eventually weakened the Amhara-dominated military regime and led to its demise in
1991. Using this opportunity, the U.S. government reestablished its relations with the
Ethiopian Empire by allying this time with the emerging Tigrayan ethnocratic elites,
which emerged from about 7 million Tigrayans. Opposing the Soviet influence in
Ethiopia and recognizing that the Amhara-based Ethiopian government had lost
credibility, the U.S. started to support the TPLF in the 1980s and prepared it financially,
ideologically, diplomatically, and militarily to replace the Amhara-led military regime by
creating the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
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With the use of Western relief aid and financial support, the TPLF/EPRDF leaders
converted the famine-stricken Tigrayan peasants and those militias who were captured at
war fronts into guerrilla fighters in the 1980s. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front also
played a central role in building the TPLF/EPRDF army.
One of the major reasons why the U.S. government chose the TPLF, as we have
mentioned above, was that the Tigrayan ethnocratic elites were perceived as a legitimate
successor to an Amhara-led government because of the racist assumptions of the West.
Ethiopia, which was created as an informal colony of Europe during the second half of
the nineteenth century, maintained its status in the global order with the help of British
global hegemonism until the U.S. inherited this role. Despite the fact that the U.S., as the
emerging hegemonic power after the World War II, encouraged decolonization and selfdetermination in the less-developed world in order to gain spheres of influence, it did not
care for these issues in the Ethiopian Empire. Since Ethiopia was the first informal
colony of Europe and America, there was no need to address these issues. As we shall see
below, in fact the U.S. rather helped Ethiopia to colonize Eritrea, former Italian and
British colony, and to incorporate it into Ethiopia. Of course, this happened after the
Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia ended with the assistance of Great Britain.
The U.S. government started its direct communication in 1943 with the de facto
Haile Selassie regime, which was under British indirect control; from then on, the regime
requested U.S. economic and military assistance. Because of its interest in the Horn of
Africa, the U.S. was receptive to the Ethiopian request and sent a Technical Mission in
1944 to help build the Ethiopian economy. Understanding the nature of the Ethiopian
client state under the aegis of British hegemonism and realizing that its interests would be
best served by associating with such a government, the U.S. wanted to establish strong
relation with this empire. After it obtained Radio Marina, a former Italian facility in
Asmara, in 1942, with the help of the British government in Eritrea (where British
imperialism replaced that of Italy in the early 1940s), the U.S. interest in the Horn of
Africa increased (Marcus, 1983: 83).
With a base in Asmara, the U.S. wanted Eritrea to be incorporated into Ethiopia
when the British evacuated Eritrea, believing that its interest would be best served by this
conjunction (Marcus, 1983: 39). This position brought together U.S. and Ethiopian
interests to determine the future of Eritrea. The provision of the American Technical
Mission and support for the Ethiopian position on Eritrea was beneficial for the Ethiopian
ruling class (Marcus, 1983: 42-43). Furthermore, in alliance with Anglo-American
corporations, the upper crust of the Ethiopian ruling class established import-export
monopolies through which it controlled trade (Marcus, 1983: 42-43). Haile Selassie and
his officials effectively used the state bureaucracy and Anglo-American connections to
accumulate wealth and capital just as Anglo-American hegemonic interests used this
ruling class to strategic and economic advantage in the region.
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As British hegemony declined in the 1940s, the U.S. started to fill the vacuum in
the Horn of Africa. Thus, by the time Britain began to withdraw its sponsorship of
Ethiopian colonialism and planned to leave Eritrea, Ethiopian colonialists had already
sought U.S. support for Eritrean incorporation. For its part, the U.S. found the Ethiopian
client state to be an ally unlikely to threaten its interests in the Horn of Africa and the
Middle East. The alliance between the Ethiopian colonialists and the U.S. imperialists
emerged strongly in the early 1950s. Recognizing that the British had started
withdrawing from the Horn in 1951 because of its declining strength as a world power,
the Ethiopian government brought arguments before the United Nations to annex the two
former Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia that were under British rule.
Although Ethiopia reconsolidated its colonial rule over Ogaden Somalia, it could
not incorporate Italian Somalia, since the United Nations established a trust territory over
it for a ten-year period. But by resolution of the UN General Assembly on December 2,
1950, Eritrea was federated to the Ethiopian Empire in 1952; within a decade it was
annexed by Ethiopia. The UN decision was based on a commission recommendation that
the Eritreans “were not ready for a self government and that the country was not alone an
economically viable unit” (Cumming, 1953: 128). Thus, UN action also facilitated the
processes of Ethiopian expansion through colonization; the U.S. strongly supported this
process because of its regional and global interests. Ethiopia and the U.S. signed a mutual
defense assistance agreement in 1953. As the hegemonic power, the U.S. had the
responsibility to maintain client states such as of Ethiopia in the capitalist world
economy; between 1946 and 1973, it spent more than $62 billion worldwide on military
assistance programs (U.S. Agency of International Development, 1974: 6).
U.S. hegemony was built in the less developed world through military assistance
to the ruling classes and their governments (Magdoff, 1970), and the Ethiopian client
state was a beneficiary: The Ethiopian state was mainly interested in dependable security
against internal and external opposition forces. On its part, the U.S. was interested in
securing continuing base rights in Asmara, and in developing a major military and
monitoring station there. Describing the importance to U.S. strategic interests of a base in
the Horn of Africa, Peter Schwab (1979: 91) says of the region: “Close to the Middle
East and the Indian Ocean, it flanks the oil-rich states of Arabia, controls the Babel
Mandeb Straits, one of the narrow arteries of Israel’s lifeline . . . dominates an area of the
Gulf of Aden and of the Indian Ocean through which oil tankers are constantly moving,
and overlooks the passage at which the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean
converge. It is a major geopolitical area of the world.”
As part of its global strategy to secure hegemony in the capitalist world economy
and to prevent the influence of the Soviet Union, the U.S. sought to dominate this part of
Africa (Schwab, 1979: 92). The U.S. also considered “its political investment in Ethiopia
as an investment toward the future realization of its wider interests in Africa” (AgyemanDuah, 1984: 209).
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The defense treaty closely linked Ethiopian colonialism to American hegemonism
(Ottaway and Ottaway, 1978: 150). The Americans expanded their Asmara base and
modernized the Ethiopian military by training and equipping it with modern weapons. An
American military advisory group replaced the British Military Mission in Ethiopia.
According to Halliday and Molyneux (1981: 215), “Between 1951 and 1976 Ethiopia
received over $350 million economic aid from the U.S.A. and a further $279 million in
military aid. In the years 1953-75, 3,552 Ethiopian military personnel were trained in the
U.S.A. itself.” Most of the U.S. assistance to Ethiopia was seen as rent for Kagnew
Station and was estimated as averaging $10-12 million per year for a twenty-five-year
period (Korry 1976: 37).
When the British military mission withdrew in 1951, “the Ethiopian army was
still only partially organized and poorly trained and equipped. It was under such
conditions that the emperor turned to the United States for assistance” (Agyeman-Duah,
1984: 110). Haile Selassie was successful in obtaining U.S. military aid (Schwab, 1979:
92). As the events unfolded in the 1960s—an attempted military coup, the emergence of
various anti-colonial movements, and the appearance of a radical student movement—
the modernization approach of the U.S. through state-building strategy proved
vulnerable. Consequently, the politics of order began to emerge. “The military, in
conjunction with other security forces,” Baffour Agyeman-Duah (1984: 179) writes,
“became the instrument for social control and counterinsurgency during the turbulent
years of the 1960s, and an active American support in all this was by no means limited.”
Despite its claim of democratic ideals, the U.S. helped the Ethiopian colonial regime to
stay in power by suppressing the peoples. “The United States sent in counterinsurgent
teams, increased its military aid programs, and expanded its modernization and training
program for the Ethiopian military. An extensive air force was also created with United
States vintage jets” (Schwab, 1979: 95).
There is no doubt that the U.S. military and economic assistance had prolonged
Haile Selassie’s regime. Schwab asserts “Without the military weapons received from the
United States, it was unlikely that Haile Selassie could have maintained himself on the
throne. Half of all United States military assistance to Africa was channeled to Ethiopia,
and Kagnew, the American military base near Asmara, quartered some thirty-two
hundred of the six thousand U.S. military personnel stationed in Ethiopia” (Schwab,
1979: 101). In the 1960s, the decolonization of British and Italian Somaliland, the Soviet
alliance with the newly emerged Somali state, anti-colonial movements in the empire and
internal rivalry within the Ethiopian ruling class had threatened the foundation of the
Haile Selassie regime. Harold Marcus (1983: 114) points out that “By forcing
Washington continuously to increase its commitments, Addis Ababa made the United
States an actor in Ethiopia’s internal politics.”
136
The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.4, no.3, March 2011

The U.S. alliance with Ethiopia was mainly for strategic and geopolitical reasons,
not economic ones, and U.S. business investment was insignificant (Mohammed, 1969:
76). For instance, American-based firms invested almost $10 million in oil exploration
(without success) in Ogaden Somalia (Luther, 1958: 136). The U.S. modernization
programs were both economic and educational. To integrate closely the U.S.-Ethiopian
ideological alliance, the Point Four program under the U.S. International Cooperation
Administration was extended to Ethiopia in 1952. The stated purpose of this program was
to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the less developed world through providing
technical and administrative expertise (Luther, 1958: 132). But, in practice, the U.S. was
interested in consolidating the Ethiopian ruling class, which had little knowledge of the
modern world in technical and administrative fields.
Through its Point Four Program, the U.S. trained and developed Ethiopian
colonial bureaucrats in the fields of agriculture, public administration, finance,
commerce, industry, and health. The program included on-the-job-training and education
in the empire and abroad. Agricultural schools, such as those of Jimma and Ambo, and a
College of Agriculture in Hararghe were established. A Public Health College and a
nurse and midwife training schools were opened. In 1958, some 130 U.S. specialists
participated, mainly in the areas of agriculture, education, and health (Luther, 1958: 133).
The U.S. modernization programs continued in the 1960s and the 1970s. Thousands of
Peace Corps volunteers were sent to implement such programs. For almost twenty-six
years, the U.S dispatched its diplomats and intellectuals to apply its modernization
principles in building and maintaining the Ethiopian Empire in accord with U.S. national
and global interests. In this the U.S. emulated British hegemonism, facilitating the
development of colonial capitalism mainly in Oromia.
Between 1977 and 1991, since the Mengistu regime allied with the former Soviet
Union, the influence of the U.S. on Ethiopia declined. With the emergence of the
Tigrayan-led Ethiopian government, the U.S. reestablished its hegemony in Ethiopia by
claiming that it promotes democracy. As we shall see below, however, the essence and
characteristics of U.S. foreign policy in Ethiopia has remained more of the same. In 1991,
the U.S. supported the emergence of the Meles regime. It still provides all necessary
assistance to the regime. As far as U.S. policy makers believe that the U.S. self-interest is
promoted, they are not interested in having a deep and critical understanding of the
political context in which they are involved.
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The U.S. and the Meles Government
Currently the main rationale of U.S. policy makers’ involvement in Ethiopia is to
maintain political order and to fight against global “terrorism.” The major reason why the
U.S. government cannot effectively deal with global terrorism is that it practices double
standards, and ignores the terrorism of friendly states such as that of Ethiopia whilst
complaining about other forms of terrorism (Jalata, 2005). Eqbal Ahmad (1998: 7)
comments that as a global power the U.S. “cannot promote terrorism in one place and
reasonably expect to discourage terrorism in another place.” Supporting the Tigrayan-led
Ethiopian regime that engages in terrorism and massive human rights violations on
various population groups in general and the Oromo in particular demonstrates that the
U.S. is not committed to promote democracy, human rights, and social justice.
During the early 1990s, there were scholars and political activists who believed
that the U.S., as the only superpower, would promote human rights and democracy in
Oromia and Ethiopia and in other peripheral countries. But the practical reality in
Ethiopia challenges that position. U.S. officials are more concerned with political
stability, economic reform, and the existence of regimes such as that of Ethiopia at any
cost, and care less for democracy and human rights. As the Economist (1997: 36) notes,
Meles Zenawi “is regarded as one of Africa’s ‘new leaders’: he recently won an award in
the United States for good government . . . Their [Western] governments tend to give
priority to the Prime Minister’s economic reforms rather than his record on human
rights.” Even if the U.S. does not oppose the principles of human rights and democracy in
theory, the issues of human rights and democracy in Oromia and Ethiopia are not its
priority, and it gives only lip service to them.
The Meles regime is acceptable to the West in general and the U.S. in particular
as far as it can suppress popular opposition forces in order to establish political stability
and implement the structural adjustment of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Of course, the U.S. and other Western governments do not want their
respective citizens to be able to recognize that human rights and democracy are being
compromised. Despite the fact that successive American Presidents have claimed that
they would promote American democratic ideals in the world, practically they have
hindered the progress toward democracy in peripheral countries. For instance, President
George Walker Bush, in his second inaugural address promised that the U.S. foreign
policy would challenge political tyranny by supporting forces of democracy and freedom
in the world. In his words, “So is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements in every nation and every culture, with the ultimate
goal of ending tyranny in our world.”
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He emphasized that the freedom of the U.S. is connected to the freedom of others.
Gradually it became clear that he asserted this noble political idea to justify his imperial
war in Iraq; his government continued to support dictatorship and ethnocracy in Ethiopia
and other countries. The Oromo, the largest national group in the Ethiopian empire,
meanwhile, struggle to restore their cultural heritage and wounded people-hood, and
oppose any dogmatic social or ideological system. They struggle to establish the rule of
law, to practice self-determination, and to promote multinational democracy. For the
Oromo, democracy is not a new concept, but it is part of their culture and tradition. They
do not have the luxury of fighting against the interest of the West, particularly that of the
U.S. Since they have been abused in the names of Christianity, Islam, socialism,
democracy, and free market, the Oromo take things pragmatically and practically.
In the early 1990s, the OLF and other independent Oromo organizations were
ready to work within the system if fair and free elections would take place in Ethiopia.
Global powers ignored their own policy of democracy promotion, when the Tigrayan
ethnocratic regime declared war on these organizations in 1992 to expel them from the
Ethiopian political process. The U.S. policy of “democracy promotion” or
democratization of the polity drastically failed in Ethiopia (Robinson, 1997) because the
U.S. has no commitment for the promotion of democracy. Another reason why the
democratization of Ethiopian polity failed was because of the fundamental contradictions
that exist between the Ethiopian colonizers and the colonized peoples (Holcomb, 1997:
73-74). Many scholars assume that the West and the U.S. promote elite democracy when
they are sure that those who will come to state power through election are not against the
capitalist world system (Robinson, 1996), 1996). This is not true in the case of Ethiopia.
Although the Oromo leadership was ready to promote elite democracy, the U.S
preferred to support the Tigrayan dictatorship and ethnocracy. Despite the fact that most
international observers concluded that the June 21, 1992, elections “exacerbated existing
tensions, reinforced the hegemonic power of the EPRDF while marginalizing other
fledging parties, and were a central factor in the withdrawal of the OLF from the TGE
and the return to war in the Oromo region,” Western governments have continued to
support the Tigrayan-led regime (National Democratic Institute, 1992: 7). The U.S.
government has chosen to support the Tigrayan ethnocratic minority regime. The
decision by the U.S. to support the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist government (Jalata,
2005) has nothing to do with economic or political rationality. Although the U.S. and
other Western countries do not openly admit that the strategy of democracy promotion
failed in Ethiopia, they have recognized that the Ethiopian crisis is expanding.
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Nevertheless, they have continued to back the Meles regime, while at the same
time searching for the strategy of establishing elite democracy in case the Tigrayan
regime fails to establish political stability. Stevens Trucker (1997: 1), the USAID
governance advisor to Ethiopia, says, “Ethiopia’s prospects for long-term stability and
sustainable long term-growth are dependent upon the sustained democratization of the
polity. Indeed, in the absence of a progressively more accessible, participatory, and
tolerant political environment, the future may come to resemble the past.” But, the same
official source refuses to recognize the crimes that this regime has committed against the
people, and ignores the existence of political dissent. The same official also promises that
even if this regime is not democratic now it will be in the future. This official denies the
existence of political conflict, endorses Tigrayan authoritarianism, and promotes the idea
that this regime can stay in power for decades and later will establish democracy.
The U.S. has been committed to supporting this regime to the extent that it will
not be an embarrassment to its international image. In the rhetoric of democracy and
good governance, the U.S. is generously financing the Tigrayan-led government. This is
an unwise political and economic investment, and has nothing to do with the American
national interest. The Tigrayan ruling elites and the U.S. political operatives and theorists
have conveniently convinced themselves that the Oromo and other peoples do not
understand the genuine meaning of democracy. Receiving the green light from the U.S.
and following his blind ambition for personal and Tigrayan ethnonational interests, Meles
expelled all independent liberation fronts and political organizations from the Ethiopian
political process through state terrorism and replaced them with puppet organizations that
he and his group had already created under the umbrella of EPRDF. This is what
democracy means for EPRDF and its international supporters.
It should surprise no one that Meles sought advice from Samuel Huntington,
whose writings portray him as a Eurocentric, covert racist, and a Christian chauvinist.
Samuel Huntington (1993), the U.S. policy ideologue, went to Ethiopia in 1993 as a
consultant to advise Meles Zenawi on how to establish a Tigrayan party rule in the name
of democracy. It is clear from a reading of Huntington’s book, The Clash of Civilizations,
that he opposes the principles of democracy and cultural diversity and promotes Christian
civilization at any cost. The U.S. policy as articulated by Huntington has intensified
rather than solved the historical and contemporary contradictions between the Ethiopian
colonizers and the colonized Oromo and others. As a result, the Oromo who were willing
to participate in democracy have been forced to intensify their cultural, intellectual, and
armed struggles. Rather than finding a just and democratic solution, the U.S. has openly
allied itself with the Meles regime that practices state terrorism, hidden genocide, and
gross human rights violations.
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Just as the Meles regime rationalizes its political practices by asserting that
democracy exists in Ethiopia, the U.S. claims that this regime is committed to promoting
democracy, civil liberty, free markets, and the rule of law (U.S. Department of State on
Human Rights, 1993, 1997). The U.S., other Western countries, and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) (currently called AU) called the sham elections, which the Meles
government used to legitimize its power satisfactorily fair and free (Reuters, May 15,
1995). These Western countries and the OAU never cared to explain how the Meles
government managed to expel all opposition political organizations and made its party
the only candidate, forcing the people to vote for its ruling party (The Economist, August,
16, 1997). Of course, there are a few collaborators from all ethnonational groups who
support the Meles regime and carry out the regime’s policies against the colonized
nations for their personal gains.
The Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) is such a collaborative
group. It was created by the TPLF to do a political dirty job in Oromia for the Tigrayanled regime in exchange for money and luxurious life styles. Some members of the OPDO
were Oromos who were forced to join this organization because they were prisoners of
war and were convinced by the TPLF leaders that they would be the made leaders of the
Oromo people. Others joined the organization to promote their personal interests or
naively believed that they would do something for their people.
The Tigrayan-led regime is still in power mainly because of the financial and
military assistance it receives from the U.S. and other industrialized countries. The U.S.,
other Western countries, and Israel have also used the discourse of Islamic
fundamentalism to support the Meles regime and to suppress the struggles of the Oromo
and others for self-determination, social justice, and democracy (Impact International,
March 1997; Africa Confidential, October 1997). This implies that since some Oromos
and others are Muslims, they are Islamic fundamentalists, and are not entitled to
democracy and national self-determination. In reality, the Oromo and others are not
struggling to expand Islam or to suppress it. They only struggle for their democratic
rights that have been suppressed by Ethiopian settler colonialism and global tyranny.
That is why the majority of Oromo—Christian, Muslim, and non-Christian and nonMuslim— support the OLF, the secular organization that leads the Oromo national
movement (Jalata, 1996: 95-123; Jalata, 1997: 83-114).
In the past the colonization of the Oromo and others was rationalized and justified
by various ideological discourses. It was rationalized that since these peoples were
“pagans” and “uncivilized” and that Habashas were Christians and “civilized,” they were
entitled to colonize these peoples and impose their civilization and Christianity on them.
Now Islamic fundamentalism has become an ideological tool for the rationalization,
justification, and suppression of these peoples by the Tigrayan colonial elites and their
Western supporters.
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The Oromo and other peoples are labeled as “Islamic fundamentalists” and their
liberation fronts are implicitly labeled as “bandits” or “terrorists” (The Economist,
August 16, 1997: 36). Consequently, the violations of their human rights by
internationally financed state terrorism generate no sympathy from the world community.
Samuel Huntington (1996: 217) openly expresses the West’s attitude toward Islam: “The
underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different
civilization whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed
with the inferiority of their power.”
Samuel Huntington and others who hate Islam ignore the fate of Christian
Oromos who have Muslim sisters and brothers. Similarly, the Oromo national struggle is
not supported by the Muslim world because some Oromos are Christians and the Oromo
national struggle is secular. Even Muslim Oromo refugees are not welcomed by the
Muslim world. The U.S. and other Western countries engage in these kinds of
unproductive foreign policy practices for two major reasons. The first reason is that the
foreign policy experts of these countries have a superficial or distorted understanding of
conditions like those existing in the Ethiopian Empire. In these kinds of situations, these
policy experts prefer to side with the elites of one ethnonational group in a multinational
society, believing that it is easier to dominate, control, and exploit various population
groups. The second reason is that these foreign policy experts do not have a single
standard for humanity. In the thinking of these foreign policy experts, the peoples of the
world are hierarchically organized because of the superiority and inferiority of genes,
cultures, and civilizations.
Such policy practices ignore the consequences of the radicalization of state power
and the denial of indigenous and colonized peoples like the Oromo to have access to state
power and other opportunities. State terrorism, hidden genocide, and massive human
rights violations are used to keep the Oromo and other peoples subordinated and
exploited. Today, the Ethiopian colonial settlers led by the Tigrayan regime have
dominated cities and towns in Oromia and have segregated the Oromo people both in
urban and rural areas and have kept them under “Ethiopian political slavery” by using the
army, modern weapon, the media, the telephone, the fax, the Internet, and other
communication and information apparatuses and networks, as well as global connections.
Using political violence, the Meles government has dominated and controlled the Oromo
and their resources. It has denied them the freedom of expression and organization as
well as access to the media and all forms of communication and information networks.
Consequently, the Oromo are denied the freedom of self-development and are forced to
provide their economic and labor resources to the Ethiopian colonizers and their
supporters while living under deplorable conditions in the twenty-first century.
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The Meles regime has continued the previous policy of settling armed Amharas
and Tigrayans in Oromia, and it planned to settle 2.2 million people within a few years
(The Oromia Support Group, December 2002, no. 38, p. 13). At the same time, in order
to de-Oromize Finfinne, the capital city of the Ethiopian empire, it moved the capital city
of Oromia from this city to Adama (Nazareth), and in 2002, it also started to evict Oromo
farmers surrounding Finfinne (Addis Ababa) by force (The Oromia Support Group,
December, 2002, no. 38, p. 13) to lease the lands to Habasha elites and others. The
Oromo have no protection from political violence since there is no rule of law in Oromia
and Ethiopia. They do not have personal and public safety in their homes and
communities. They are exposed to massive political violence, human right violations, and
absolute poverty. Because of the magnitude of the Oromo problem, it is impossible to
provide a numerical face to the devastating effects of violence, poverty, hunger,
suffering, malnutrition, disease, ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness.
Since the Meles regime is weak and lacks legitimacy, accountability, and
professionalism, it could not and cannot solve these massive and complex problems.
Because of their weaknesses most peripheral states “lack the capacity to meet the
demands and rights of citizens and improve the standard of living for the majority of
population” (Welsh, 2002: 67-68). Consequently, they engage in state terrorism and
genocidal massacres in order to suppress the population groups that struggle for political
and economic rights. State terrorism is a systematic governmental policy in which
massive violence is practiced on a given population group with the goal of eliminating
any behavior which promotes political struggle or resistance by members of that group.
Any state that engages in terrorism is not a protector of citizens; rather, it violates civil
and human rights through assassinations, mass killings, and imprisonments. The main
assumptions of such a state are that it can control the population by destroying their
leaders and the culture of resistance.
States that fail to establish ideological hegemony and political orders are unstable
and insecure, and hence they engage in state terrorism (Oliverio, 1997: 48-63). The Meles
government accepts state violence against the Oromo and others as a legitimate means of
establishing political stability and order. It does this despite its adoption in its constitution
of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Covenants on Human Rights. As Lisa Sharlach (2002: 107) attests, state terrorism and
genocide occur when a “dominant group, frightened by what its members perceive as an
onslaught of international and internal movements for democracy and socioeconomic
change, harnesses the state apparatus to destroy the subordinate group altogether.”
Unfortunately, the international community has ignored the crimes that the Meles
government has committed against humanity because of the support this regime has
received from the West in general and the U.S. particular.
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State terrorism is associated with issues of control of territory and resources and
the construction of political and ideological domination. Annamarie Oliverio (1997: 52)
explains two essential features of state terrorism “First, the state reinforces the use of
violence as a viable, effective, mitigating factor for managing conflict; second, such a
view is reinforced by culturally constructed and socially organized processes, expressed
through symbolic forms, and related in complex ways to present social interests. Within
increasing economic and environmental globalization, gender politics, and the resurgence
of nationalities within territorial boundaries, the discourse of terrorism, as a practice of
statecraft, is crucial to the construction of political boundaries.” The Tigrayan-led
regime mainly targets the Oromo because of their economic resources and political
resistance. According to the Oromia Support Group (Nov. 1997: 1), “Because the Oromo
occupy Ethiopia’s richest areas and comprise half of the population of Ethiopia, they are
seen as the greatest threat to the present Tigrayan-led government. Subsequently, any
indigenous Oromo organization, including the Oromo Relief Association, has been closed
and suppressed by the government. The Standard reason given for detaining Oromo
people is that they are suspected of supporting the OLF.”
The Meles regime has also engaged in looting the economic resources of Oromia
in order to develop Tigray, while settling armed Tigrayans and Amharas in Oromia, and
enriching Habasha elites and their collaborators. The regime that proclaims in its
constitution that democracy and human rights are “inviolable” and “inalienable” in
Ethiopia has engaged in terrorist activities and hidden genocide. These activities include
the systematic assassinations of prominent Oromos, both open and hidden murders of
thousands of ordinary Oromos, the reinitiation of villagization and eviction in Oromia,
the expansion of prisons in Oromia, and the incarceration of thousands Oromos in hidden
and underground concentration camps. Umar Fatanssa, an elderly Oromo, says: “We had
never experienced anything like that, not under Haile Selassie, nor under the Mengistu
regime: these people just come and shoot your son or your daughter dead in front of your
eyes” (quoted in Fossati, Namarra and Niggli, 1996: 43). In this empire, state terrorism
manifests itself in different forms: Its obvious manifestation is violence in the form of
war, assassination, murder (including burying people alive, throwing off cliffs, and
hanging them), castration, torture, and rape. The police and the army have forced the
Oromo people into submission by jailing, intimidation, and beating; they confiscated
their properties (Pollock, 1996).
Former prisoners have testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly together
against their backs and that their naked bodies were whipped. Large containers or bottles
filled with water were fixed to their testicles, or if they were women, bottles or poles
were pushed into their vaginas. Some prisoners have been locked up in empty steel
barrels and tormented with heat in the tropical sun during the day and with cold at night.
Prisoners have been forced into pits so that fire could be made on top of them.
144
The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.4, no.3, March 2011

According to Trevor Trueman (2001: 3), Chair of the Oromia Support Group, “Torture—
especially arm-tying, beating of the soles of the feet, suspension of weights from genitalia
and mock execution—is commonplace, at least in unofficial places of detention. Female
detainees estimate that several soldiers and policemen on several occasions rape 50% of
women during detention, often. The Minnesota Center for Victims of Torture has
surveyed more than 500 randomly selected Oromo refugees. The majority had been
subjected to torture and nearly all of the rest had been subjected to some kind of
government violence.”
Unfortunately, the successive U.S. administrations of
George Herbert Bush, Bill Clinton, and George Walker Bush had fully heartedly
supported this criminal regime while giving lip service for the promotion of democracy
and protection of human rights. After ruling with iron fist for almost for two decades,
Meles and his TPLF/EPRDF party are engaging in genocidal massacres and terrorist
activities in Oromia and Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian state elites who
have engaged in gross human rights violations and genocide like other criminal leaders in
some peripheral countries “not only go unpunished, they are even rewarded. On the
international scene they are accorded all the respect and courtesies due to government
officials. They are treated in accordance with diplomatic protocol in negotiations and are
seated in the General Assembly of the United Nations.” The U.S. and other Western
countries have indirectly financed state terrorism and hidden genocide in Oromia and
Ethiopia through bilateral (i.e. governmental institutions) and international institutions,
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Hiding this reality and
admiring the smartness of Meles Zenawi, David Shinn, former U.S. Ambassador to
Ethiopia, claims that U.S. influence in Ethiopia is “not uniquely critical to the Ethiopian
government” (Jimma Times, April 08, 2009). This kind of claim is self-serving and
refusing to take responsibility since he has been involved in supporting the regime. The
Ambassador and other U.S. government officials have sided with the Meles regime and
ignored the crimes committed against humanity. For how long the tax money of the U.S.
citizens is going to finance state terrorism and genocide? For how long the U.S.
government is going to ignore the issues of democracy and human rights in the Horn of
Africa in general and Oromia and Ethiopia in particular? Will the Obama administration
continue to finance mass murders, hidden genocide, and gross human rights violations?
Will it continue to finance state terrorism in the form of war, assassination or murder,
castration, burying people alive, throwing of cliffs, torture, and rape, confiscation of
properties, beating, and disarming of people?
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Will the Obama Administration Introduce Change in U.S. Foreign
Policy?
Considering his political slogan of change and his African heritage, some political
observers, experts, and African activists expect that the Obama administration will
introduce some reforms in U. S. African policy. Suggesting that his “administration has
an opportunity to fundamentally remake U.S. relations with Africa during its tenure,”
John Prendergast and John Norris (2009: 1) state the following: “As the first president of
the United States with immediate African roots, President Obama not only has an
important reservoir of goodwill on the continent, he also has the ability to move beyond
the tendentious ‘North-South’ debate between developed and less developed countries
that has made more transformational policies difficult to attain. Efforts by the dying
generation of Africa’s strong men who believe they should rule for life . . . to portray
President Obama as a former colonial master will have little resonance in Africa or
elsewhere.” Nikki Duncan (2009: 1) also notes that “President Obama’s African heritage
naturally invokes the expectation that an Obama Administration will bring a certain
cultural sensitivity and understanding of the challenges that face the African continent,
and thus will be likely to address challenges in a more pro-active manner.” Or will the
Obama administration do more of the same when it comes to U.S. policy in Oromia and
Ethiopia?
As a legislator, Senator Barack Obama expressed his concerns on the issues of
ending the genocide in Darfur, promoted conflict resolution and peaceful elections
agendas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supported the idea of bringing
Liberian war criminals to international justice, proposed the policy of formulating a
coherent strategy for stabilizing Somalia, and advanced the agenda of fighting HIV/AIDS
in Africa (Duncan, 2009: 1). As a presidential candidate, he outlined three main
objectives, namely, intensifying the integration of Africa into the global economy,
enhancing peace and security of African states, and consolidating relationships with
governments, institutions, and civil society organizations by increasing commitment to
promoting and deepening democracy, accountability, and reducing poverty (Duncan,
2009: 2). After Obama became the president of the U.S., Phil Carter, Acting Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, revealed four U.S. foreign policy priorities: 1) Financing
security assistance programs for Africa on continental, regional and country levels; 2)
promoting democratic systems and practices in the continent; 3) facilitating economic
development; and 4) financing African health and social development.
The priority of providing security assistance programs at the level of the African
Union (AU), at the sub-regional level, and at the level of an individual state is a serious
problem at this time because most of the citizens of Africa are denied their democratic
and human rights and social justice. Under these circumstances, the main beneficiaries of
such programs are the African heads of state and their henchmen.
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Therefore, promoting security assistance programs for the AU and most African
governments is tantamount to supporting dictatorship and human rights violations. For
instance, the headquarter of AU is located in Finfinne, the center of Oromia, and this
continental organization does not oppose the political repression, state terrorism, and
gross human right violations of the Oromo and others by the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian
government. According to Associated Press (2009: 1), Meles Zenawi and his followers
are possible targets of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as many leaders of African
countries. The president of Genocide Watch, Gregory Stanton, wrote on March 23, 2009,
an open letter to the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights to admire the
action that the ICC took in issuing a warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir of
the Sudan and to investigate the crimes Meles and his government committed against
humanity in the Horn of Africa:
The action that the International Criminal Court has taken in this situation has
restored hope to peace and justice loving people, affirming that international
human rights law not only exists on paper, but in reality. It also sends an
important message to perpetrators throughout the world that impunity for their
crimes is not assured forever; which may be a primary reason that one of the first
leaders to defend Omar al-Bashir and condemn the warrant was Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, whose government has also been implicated in a
pattern of widespread perpetration of serious human rights atrocities in Ethiopia
and in Somalia. He and those within his government may be keenly aware of their
own vulnerability to similar actions by the ICC in the future that could upend a
deeply entrenched system of government-supported impunity that has protected
perpetrators from any accountability.
Gregory Stanton demonstrated how the Meles government has committed heinous
crimes through involving “in the inciting, the empowerment or the perpetration of crimes
against humanity, war crimes and even genocide, often justified by them as ‘counterinsurgency.”
The AU and most African heads of state oppose the indictment of the Sudanese
President al-Bashir by the ICC for allowing the committing of crimes against humanity in
Darfur; these leaders fear that they may face the same fate because of their engagement in
similar practices (Associated Press, 2009: 1). Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop
Desmond Tutu of South Africa on March 2, 2009 in a New York Times editorial chastised
the AU and African leaders for rallying behind al-Bashir who allowed genocide to take
place in Darfur.
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So if one of the Obama priorities is to maintain these reactionary and oppressive African
continental and state institutions without introducing reform, U.S. foreign policy on
Africa is going to be more of the same. As the East African analysts (2009: 1) states,
“Africa will not rank high on Obama’s global agenda.” If the Obama administration
wants to introduce some changes in U.S. the two requirements that Prendergast and
Norris (2009: 3) advance are helpful:
1.

African regional institutions need to become increasingly responsive to the
needs of African citizens and not just the prerogative of African heads of
state.

2.

The broader international community must recognize that war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide are not ‘African problems.’ They
are international problems that demand international solutions.

All the objectives and priorities of Barack Obama as a senator, presidential
candidate and the president reflect the general policy objective of the U.S. toward Africa;
these objectives and priorities focus on the perceived national interests of the U.S. and its
African governmental partners regardless of their positions and practices on democracy
and human rights. When he was a senator, he selectively focused on the genocide in
Darfur, the problem of democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the
political crises in Somalia by ignoring the political tragedies in the Ethiopian Empire. His
priorities of facilitating the further integration of Africa into the capitalist world system
and promoting the security of African states without the prerequisites of implementing
the principles and practices of democracy and human rights protection are tantamount to
endorsing the previous U.S. policy on Africa.
Most African policy experts such as John Prendergast and John Norris (2009) also
ignore the issues of promoting democracy and human rights and overemphasize the
significance of using the process of peacemaking as an important tool in U.S foreign
policy on Africa by focusing on the conflicts and wars in Sudan, Congo, Somalia, Chad,
Ethiopia-Eritrea, Central African Republic, and Uganda. What are missing from their
discussion are the issues of conflict and war in the Ethiopian Empire that contributes to
the conflict between the governments of Meles Zenawi and Isaias Afeworki and between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Since several opposition groups to the Meles regime have been in
Eritrea and Somalia, the regime went to conflict and war with Eritrean and some Somali
political forces such as the United Islamic Courts.
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The Meles government invaded Somalia in 2006 mainly to destroy the OLF base there,
when the Bush administration used the Meles mercenary army to uproot the power of the
United Islamic Courts. There was the convergence of political interests of the Meles
government and the Bush administration. As Ann Talbot (2006: 1) argues, Ethiopia was
“waging a proxy war on behalf of the United States.”
In the absence of the practical implementation of the principles and practices of
democracy and human rights, financing security assistance programs in Ethiopia is
consolidating the Tigrayan-led minority authoritarian-terrorist regime at the cost of the
Oromo and other ethnonations. The Meles regime uses the massive financial assistance it
receives from the West in general and the U.S. in particular to enrich the ruling elites
while engaging in political repression, state terrorism, massive human rights violations as
well as the exploitation of the dominated peoples. Is the Obama administration going to
continue the bankrupted previous U.S. foreign policy in Oromia and Ethiopia by
supporting the Meles government? Or is it going to support the proposal of Stanton that is
noted as the following: “We … believe that the Ethiopian people have been waiting long
enough for genuine justice and relief from the harsh oppression and brutal tactics
committed by a government that purports to be a partner in the War on Terror, while
terrorizing their own people. Addressing the EPRDF regime, friendly to Omar al-Bashir,
may bring greater stability to the entire Horn of Africa.”
There is no clear indication from the Obama Administration that the U.S. foreign
policy on Africa in general and Oromia and Ethiopia in particular will be reformed. As
Nikki Duncan (2009: 3) asserts, “while the elements of Obama’s Africa policy look
familiar, the mechanisms and manner of implementation will determine the actual
impact.” At this time, the priorities of President Obama do not have mechanisms of
reforming U.S. policy on Africa. Furthermore, the appointments of the former foreign
policy operatives and experts of the previous U.S. administrations who lack the critical
understanding of Africa in general and Oromia and Ethiopia in particular indicate the
continuation of the pervious U.S. foreign policy that did not take the African peoples
seriously. Susan Rice, Michelle Gavin, Tony Lake, Aaron Williams, Johnnie Carson, and
others “are just a few among several distinguished actors that have been brought on to
Obama’s team to help carve out the administration’s policies and stances on Africa and
related issues” (Duncan, 2009: 3). These individuals lack concern and commitment for
promoting democracy and human rights in Africa.
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Conclusion
If President Obama wants to stick to his slogan of change, he should not leave his
administration’s foreign policy on Oromia and Ethiopia to the bureaucrats in the U.S.
Department of State and at the African Desk. Such bureaucrats, experts, and operatives
lack deep knowledge and commitment for the promotion of democracy and the protection
of human rights. President Obama needs to provide genuine leadership from the top by
giving priority to the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in Oromia
and Ethiopia if he wants to fulfill his promises of making accountable corrupt, criminal,
and deceitful leaders who cling to power through violence. Rather than continuing the
U.S. relation with the authoritarian-terrorist regime of Meles Zenawi, the Obama
administration should establish strong relationship with liberation fronts and opposition
political parties and civil society organizations to promote genuine democracy and
accountability to protect human rights and to reduce poverty.
We hope that President Obama will not listen to forces and voices within the
American foreign policy establishment that try to maintain status quo in the Ethiopian
Empire by supporting the ethnocratic and terrorist government of Meles Zenawi. The
president “has a historic opportunity to fundamentally reshape relations between the
United States and the African continent [in general and Oromia and Ethiopia in
particular] in a way that will be truly transformational” (Prendergast and Norris, 2009: 7).
Of course, the Oromo people and others who oppose the Meles Zenawi’s government
should intensify their various forms of struggle and combine with diplomatic efforts to
convince the Obama administration by demonstrating the horrific crimes that have been
committed against humanity by this regime with the support it has received from the
West in general and the U.S. in particular. On his part, Obama as a transformational
president has a serious moral responsibility to promote the principles of democracy,
human rights, and social justice by stopping financing African criminal regimes such as
that of Meles Zenawi.
As he has denounced genocide and human rights violations in Darfur, President
Obama as the reformist president needs to denounce state terrorism, hidden genocide, and
massive human rights violations in Oromia and Ethiopia, and to assist the efforts to make
Meles Zenawi and his henchmen accountable for the horrendous crimes they have
committed against humanity. Any credible U.S. foreign policy should reverse the
previous policy that only focused on the U.S. national interest and the interest of the
Ethiopian government at the cost of the colonized and oppressed peoples. The U.S. will
benefit in security and economic arenas by genuinely promoting democracy and social
justice and protecting human rights in Oromia and Ethiopia rather than protecting the
interests of the corrupt and repressive Tigrayan ruling class and its state.
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